短期课程:主题:Models of Reputations and Relational Contracts 

(Released in:2016-03-21 )

主讲人:北京大学光华管理学院 翁翕教授

主持人:金融学院 李四光博士

时间:3月24日(星期四)上午9:00-11:00;3月24日(星期四)下午14:00-16:00;3月25日(星期五)上午9:00-11:00

地点:格致楼317会议室

主办单位:金融学院

主讲人简介:

翁翕,宾夕法尼亚大学经济学博士,就职于北京大学光华管理学院应用经济系。研究领域主要集中于Game Theory, Industry Organization, Organizational Economics, Financial Market等方向。仅2015年,翁翕老师在国际一流刊物Journal of Economic Theory和International Economic Review上总共发表四篇高质量论文,另外在Journal of Mathematical Economics发表论文数篇;翁翕老师的部分工作论文目前在Review of Economic Studies, Journal of Finance和Management Science等杂志二审。

内容提要:

Klein and Leffler (1981) argue that, in a free market, sellers who supply goods with poor performance will lose their reputation and hence future sales. This will deter the provision of poor performance. Hence, reputation can be viewed as an asset and the seller with higher reputational capital charges a higher price that Klein and Leffler interpret as a return to this capital. The value of this capital becomes zero whenever it is commonly believed that the seller supplies a good with low performance.

There are two different approaches to model reputational capital in the repeated-games literature. In the interpretative approach, the notion of reputation is used to interpret an equilibrium strategy profile in repeated games. For example, in the trigger strategy of the repeated prisoner’s dilemma game, a player’s reputation for cooperation is destroyed if the player deviates in the past. Reputation establishes a link between past behavior and expectations of future behavior, and this link is an equilibrium phenomenon, holding in some equilibria but not in others. However, the introduction of reputation involves no modification of the basic repeated game and adds nothing to the formal analysis.

Another model is usually called the “adverse selection” approach to model reputations. Reputation in these models is represented as belief about certain “types”. In order to do this, we should perturb from a game of complete information in which the players are “normal,” and switch to a game of incomplete information. The idea that a player has an incentive to build, maintain, or milk his reputation is captured by the incentive that player has to manipulate the beliefs of other players about his type. The updating of these beliefs establishes links between past behavior and expectations of future behavior. We say “reputations effects” arise if these links give rise to restrictions on equilibrium payoffs or behavior that do not arise in the underlying game of complete information.

As an asset, reputational capital requires costly investments to build and maintain. Following Mailath and Samuelson (2006) and Mailath and Samuelson (2001), we will investigate the incentives of making costly investments to build reputations.