光华讲坛:Stable Belief and Stable Matching 

(Released in:2017-07-10 )

主题:Stable Belief and Stable Matching

主讲人:刘庆民 哥伦比亚大学终身副教授

主持人:李四光老师  金融学院

  间:2017712 10:00-11:30

  点:格致楼317会议室

主办单位:金融学院   科研处

 

主讲人简介:

Qingmin Liu(刘庆民),2007毕业于斯坦福大学商学院,先后执教于耶鲁大学,宾夕法尼亚大学和哥伦比亚大学,现为哥伦比亚大学经济系终身副教授,在博弈论和应用微观理论等多个领域发表了有影响力的研究。近五年的成果主要包括:在Econometrica, Journal of Political EconomyReview of Economic Studies三个期刊发表论文5篇,在Journal of Economic TheoryTheoretical EconomicsJEEA发表论文6篇。

 

主讲内容:

We study stability for matching games with transferable utility and one-sided asymmetric information. Stability, capturing immunity to individual and pair wise deviations, imposes consistency requirements on the publicly observable matching outcomes and the uninformed agents’ beliefs. We investigate efficiency properties which stable belief and stable matching must jointly satisfy for a class of matching problems.